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Abstract 
The Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino administration witnessed a series of social policy reforms such 
as Republic Act (RA) 10533 (K-12 Law) and RA 10354 (Reproductive Health Law). The 
political process of this reform is full of intellectual puzzles considering the conventional 
knowledge on Philippine politics, which is mainly shaped by the framework of weak state. 
Why was the administration able to carry out the reforms despite the strong opposition from 
vested interests sustaining the weak state? This paper argues that ambitious politicians, i.e., 
those who differ in policy positions and seek to challenge the existing power structure, can 
work with policy advocates both in public and private sectors and create policy coalitions 
which result into policy reform. By tracing the political process of forming the policy coalitions, 
this paper aims to reveal the dynamic aspect of Philippine politics which has been neglected 
because of the dominance of the weak state framework. 
 
Keywords: policy reform; policy coalition; ambitious politician; K-12; reproductive health 
law; civil society; social policy 
 
Introduction 
The Philippine government led by President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino (2010-2016) carried 
out a series of social reforms. 1 The administration highlighted social policies rather than 
economic or industrial policies when it announced the “landmark legislation” to emphasize its 
achievements in the first three years in office. The government, for instance, claimed that it 
strengthened the excise tax on alcohol and tobacco products through the Sin Tax Reform Act 
(RA 10351, hereafter the Sin Tax Law) for the purpose of enhancing the universal health care 
system (Sidel 2014).2It also carried out an educational reform to extend the basic education 
period from 10 years to 12 years through the Enhanced Basic Education Act (RA 10533, 
hereafter K-12 Law).3 Moreover, it even stated that “Congress — spurred by the marching 
orders of President Aquino — made history in enacting the Responsible Parenthood and 
Reproductive Health Act (RA 10354, hereafter RH Law).4 
The claim of making history through social policy reform seems to be more than a usual 
self-admiration considering the controversies in the policy making process of each law. In fact, 
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one of the above-mentioned measures had been discussed for more than five decades, but 
opposed, taken the teeth out of regulations, or simply abandoned before the Noynoy Aquino 
administration. For instance, the powerful tobacco lobby had prevented the Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo administration (2001-2010) from fully enforcing the sin tax. Most of those who 
opposed the extension of basic education cycles were actually educational professionals who 
knew the financial difficulties of families to send their children because of hidden costs of “free” 
education. Meanwhile, in the case of reproductive health, we can find a series of clashes 
between the advocates and the highly organized Roman Catholic Church, whose political 
power is not negligible in the Philippines as we will see below. 
Why was the Aquino administration able to achieve the series of policy reforms despite 
the weakness of the state? Who were the actual policymakers making the policy reform 
possible? Why did they take initiatives for the reform? How did they face the opposition? 
This paper addresses these questions by examining the politics shaped by policy 
coalitions composed of ambitious politicians, professionals, nongovernment organizations 
(NGO) workers, and so on.5As it will be explained more in the first section, this paper sheds a 
new light on the actions by politicians. Some of them just follow the logic of patronage politics 
and enjoy the benefits of being the allies of the president; others may differ in position on 
particular policy issues from the incumbent president or even challenge the existing vested 
interest structure of the weak state. This paper calls the politicians who take the latter type of 
the action ambitious politicians because they are more determined and energetic to make a 
difference. Some of them seek higher office such as the presidency, vice-presidency or the 
Senate, by projecting themselves as the politicians who are serious about the national agenda. 
This paper argues that the policy coalitions sustained by the ambitious politicians can 
make a difference even in a situation where there is a weak state. The rest of the paper is 
composed of four sections and a conclusion. The first section explains the politics of policy 
coalition as a framework to understand the dynamics of Philippine politics. The second section 
studies the emergence of the policy coalition working for the reproductive health law. It traces 
the process of coalition making by changing the way to frame the issue, which enabled different 
groups of policy advocates to work together under the same umbrella. The third section studies 
the educational reform in which some members of private business took the initiative in 
cooperation with several professionals in the field of education. In both cases, we can find 
ambitious politicians who supported the reform at the risk of temporal political setbacks, which 
is the topic of the fourth section. The conclusion puts the findings in a broader context of 
Philippine politics. 
 
The politics of policy coalitions 
The politics of social policy reform is, in fact, an intellectual puzzle for those who are familiar 
with conventional knowledge of Philippine politics. This is because the Philippines has been 
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assumed as a weak state where the government resources are exploited by political families, 
whose rent-seeking activities have often prevailed over public interests (Anderson 1988, 
Youngblood 1987, McCoy 1994). Those who study the winning coalition at the time of 
democratization highlight the conservative nature of the “dominant bloc” composed of the 
business elites, the Catholic Church, and the foreign forces such as the United States (U.S.) 
government sustaining the status quo (Hedman 2006a). 
The analysis adopting the concept of the weak state has been reproduced in comparative 
studies of Southeast Asia. Kuhonata, for instance, classifies the Philippine state into the 
category of patrimonial state (Kuhonta 2008). In his comparative study of the Asian financial 
crises in 1997, Pepinsky also argues that the Philippine government avoided the crises because 
of its small amount of foreign capital due to its infamous rent-seeking activities (Pepinsky 
2015). In a comparative study on welfare regimes in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, Haggard and Kaufman argue that the Philippines has been suffering from patronage 
politics, which has prevented the government from providing social welfare, and repeatedly 
characterize the Philippines as an exceptional case in East Asia (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 
32, 66, 188, 191, 261).6 
As long as we accept these conventional literature on the Philippine state, however, we 
cannot understand the initiatives for the social policy reform by the Aquino administration. The 
administration secured the RH law despite strong opposition by the Catholic Church, or the 
part of the so-called dominant bloc. In terms of the K-12, the administration also went beyond 
the logic of the weak state dominated by oligarchs who have sought short-term interests for 
their own districts at the sacrifice of the public interests of the nation. How should we 
understand the politics of reform? 
There are three different approaches in studying the dynamics of Philippine politics, 
which help us to understand the politics of policy coalitions. First, there are rich studies on civil 
society in the Philippines (e.g. Hedman 2006a; Quimpo 2008). Among them, Quimpo’s 
argument of contested democracy fits most of our study. In his study on restored democracy 
after 1986, he highlights the role of the left movement in electoral politics. He traces the 
changing strategy of the left movement and highlights the split of the left in the early 1990s, 
which resulted into the emergence of social democrats (Rocamora 1994; Quimpo 2008; Tolosa 
2011). His study encourages us to widen our eyesight to understand the dynamics of Philippine 
politics beyond the weak state. While his study focuses on democratic consolidation contested 
by the oligarchs and the left, this study unpacks the politics of policymaking shaped by 
policymakers who work for social policy reform. 
Second, recent studies on economic policymaking provide us with a useful perspective 
to understand social policy reform (Raquiza 2012; Takagi 2016). Instead of viewing politics as 
structural constraints of policymaking, these studies suggest that political power struggle can 
be a thrust for policymaking. In the 1930s, for instance, then young but promising politicians 
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worked for making a central bank in cooperation with professionals despite the opposition or 
neglect by the American colonial authority and established Filipino colonial politicians (Takagi 
2016, ch. 2-3). In her comparative study on economic policymaking in Thailand and the 
Philippines, Raquiza argues that Filipino policymakers have prioritized political calculation 
over economic rationality (Raquiza 2012). She, for instance, highlights the facts that President 
Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) attacked economic interests of his political enemies such as the 
Lopezes through various economic policies, while the successive Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) 
and Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) administrations made use of decentralization as well as 
liberalization to dismantle the economic bases of Marcos cronies after 1986 (Raquiza 2012). A 
series of studies on technocracy in Southeast Asia also argues that we should study the political 
dimension of economic policymaking (Tadem, Khoo, and Shiraishi 2014). We can, therefore, 
expect some positive roles of particular politicians seeking for power even in the reform policy 
making. 
Third, those who criticize the monolithic view of the weak state revisit the politics of 
the president. Abinales, for instance, mentions that the president is supported by coalitions 
which cannot be resolved into individual politicians seeking for interests in their own districts, 
but which are composed of different groups with their own agenda. The coalition politics might 
create pockets of efficacy in the midst of weak state capability (Abinales 2005; also cf. Evans 
1995). In addition, Thompson specifies four main groups shaping the dynamics; these are civil 
society, the Church, big business and the military (Thompson 2014). 
The remaining question in the literature on political coalition might be what the 
presidency exercises its muscle on. Even if the presidents attempt to use their power for their 
own political survival, they should choose whether they utilize the existing power structure 
through patronage or dismantle or at least unsettle it by policy reform. In one article, Thompson 
argues that there is a cycle in Philippine presidential politics, which is reform, populism, and 
patronage (Thompson 2010). As he aptly mentions, the mainstream presidential style after 
democratization is reform and good governance (i.e. no corruption) but at the same time, the 
style could be interrupted by different styles such as populism and patronage politics. 
While the existing study on coalition politics has succeeded in highlighting pockets of 
efficacy under the power of the presidency (Abinales 2005), this study focuses more on the 
process of creating particular policy coalitions including the ambitious politicians. This is 
because the emergence of coalitions based on policy ideas are independent of the rhythm of 
presidential elections and institutional capability of the president, or the so-called “presidential 
bandwagon” (cf. Kasuya 2008).As we will see below, there are examples of the politicians who 
play an essential role in policymaking which is not necessarily supported by the incumbent 
presidents. These politicians are more ambitious than the politicians seeking only for a bigger 
share of their patronage.7  They are ambitious in the sense that they are determined in a 
particular policy issue and so aggressive to choose the opposing position against the president. 
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They attempt to project themselves as new leaders by advocating new policy proposals which 
might change the vested interest structure (cf. Takagi 2016). 
The policy coalition often involves advocates in the private sectors both in civil society 
and businesses because of the institutional nature of the Philippine state which makes the 
policymaking process porous to various actors.8As most observers have pointed out, the 1987 
Constitution in fact encourages members of civil society to work for the public goods through 
various institutional arrangements including the party-list system of representation, or a type 
of proportional representation, in the Lower House of Congress (Abinales 2005, 136; Faustino 
and Fabella 2014, 37-38). Moreover, there are several cases where presidential appointees 
begin to work in acting capacity but fail to be concurred by the bicameral Commission on 
Appointments of Congress, which resulted in increasing number of people who are appointed 
to the posts.  
Besides, the constitution only allows a single term for the president who can appoint 
various high ranking officials in government, which eventually created a pool of professionals 
who know policymaking not only within but also outside of the government. Even under almost 
a decade-long Arroyo presidency (2001-2010), for instance, the president appointed cabinet 
members more than twice. Because of the expose of possible electoral fraud in the general 
election in 2004, high ranking officials including cabinet secretaries resigned from the Arroyo 
administration. Those who resigned are thereafter called the Hyatt 10, because they held a press 
conference at the Hyatt hotel to announce their resignation. Among the Hyatt 10, the 
succeeding Noynoy Aquino administration appointed Corazon “Dinky” Soliman, the Secretary 
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Florencio “Butch” Abad, the Secretary 
of the Department of Budget and Management, and so forth.  
Combining the perspectives on the politics of contested democracy, economic policy 
making, and coalition politics, this study sheds a new light on the roles played by the policy 
coalitions. The coalitions are not necessarily formed or deformed by the president, though they 
depend on the power of the presidency to carry out the policy proposals. This paper hereafter 
traces the process in which policymakers either in civil society or government began their 
advocacy, and then form policy coalitions with several politicians who know policymaking but 
are not satisfied with the status quo. 
 
The policy coalition for the Reproductive Health Law 
The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, or the RH Law, is, in essence, an 
act to promote reproductive health through the distribution of contraceptive measures in family 
and sex education in schools. Before the passage of the RH Law, the women’s rights 
movements have advocated the reproductive rights for decades, while some economists have 
supported family planning considering its possible contribution to economic growth 
(Danguilan 1997; Ocampo 2014, 119). The passage of the law was a milestone for the 
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advocates. 
The passage of the RH Law is, however, not an achievement but rather a setback for a 
leading Catholic organization in the country, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the 
Philippines (CBCP). The CBCP opposed the RH bill by arguing that the bill gives people “a 
moral choice: to choose life or to choose death” (Odchimar 2011). The CBCP has opposed any 
form of contraception including “contraceptive mentality” for decades (Legaspi 1990). 
According to its “guiding principles,” the Church is an authority for teaching responsible 
parenthood, with which parents should not avoid procreation and must raise children. 
According to their view, the contraceptive mentality is opposing the procreation, hence it is a 
culture of death (Bautista 2010).9The church can promote natural family planning but does not 
allow its usage with the contraceptive mentality (Legaspi 1990). 
The CBCP’s opposition has serious political meaning in the Philippines, not only 
because more than 80 percent of its population are Roman Catholic but because the CBCP has 
actively engaged itself in politics since democratization in 1986 (Youngblood 1987).  At the 
beginning of the downfall of the Marcos regime, the CBCP led by the charismatic Jaime 
Cardinal Sin declared its opposition to Marcos’ regime and its support to the anti-Marcos 
struggle (Thompson 1996). Sin continuously supported Corazon Aquino, who took over the 
presidency, through personal consultation with her and by publishing pastoral letters on 
political issues such as elections, the Constitution, and so on (Youngblood 1987; Claudio 2013, 
48-50). In the process of constitution making, in fact, the CBCP succeeded in sending at least 
one religious representative in two-thirds of the preparatory committees and in reflecting their 
interests in the 1987 Constitution such as a ban on abortion, religious instruction in public 
schools, and parental rights in educational and family planning decisions (Youngblood 1987, 
1250). Because of the ban on abortion by the Constitution, in fact, health and medical 
professionals advocating contraceptives are accused as “anti-life” by the Church (Claudio 2013, 
49, 181). 
The CBCP was fully aware of its influence on constitution making and made use of its 
past achievements in the midst of the controversy over the RH law. For instance, the CBCP 
said, 
 
we [CBCP] begin [its pastoral letter] by citing the Philippine Constitution. We do so 
because we intend to write you on the basis of the fundamental ideals and aspirations 
of the Filipino people and not on the basis of specifically Catholic religious teachings,” 
and reiterated that “we strongly reject the RH bill [sic]. (Odchimar 2011) 
 
The CBCP clearly opposed the bill not as a religious order but more as a political pressure 
group. 
Considering the nature of the above-mentioned dominant bloc and vocal opposition by 
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the CBCP against the RH bill, the strong support by President Aquino, none other than the son 
of former President Corazon Aquino, to the RH bill is a puzzle to be explained. Aquino won 
the presidential election mainly because of his mother’s reputation and the memory of people 
power in 1986 (Thompson 2014).Corazon Aquino, a devout Catholic and a close friend of 
Cardinal Sin, was close to the position of the CBCP when it comes to reproductive rights. The 
CBCP remained active in politics and in fact succeeded in preventing the successive 
governments from making reproductive health measures (Ocampo 2014). 
We now shift our focus from inside the government to outside, in order to find the origin 
of the RH law. 
The concept of reproductive health is a focal point where various stakeholders including 
social movement activists, medical practitioners, and economists could jump into the issue. 
President Fidel Ramos was the first president who faced a confrontational Church on this issue 
because of his uncooperative relations with Cardinal Sin of the CBCP (Youngblood 1998). 
After Ramos, a non-Catholic, took over the presidency from Aquino in 1992, he announced 
Philippines 2000 as his administration’s agenda for development (Ramos 1993). He pointed 
out that the Philippines had a 2.3 % population growth rate, which was one of the highest in 
the region, and argued that his administration aimed at decreasing it to below 2 % by the end 
of his presidency (Ramos 1993).10 To achieve this, President Ramos appointed a well-known 
medical doctor, Juan Flavier, as the health secretary despite opposition from Sin (Youngblood 
1998, 12). 
Flavier was often remembered as the doctor to the barrios because of his social 
engagement through the Philippine Rural Reform Movement (PRRM), one of the largest NGOs 
in the Philippines (Flavier 1970). He was born to a family of mechanics working at a mining 
site in Balatoc, Benguet in 1935 (InterAksyon 2014). After graduating from the College of 
Medicine, the University of the Philippines, he began working at the PRRM to promote health 
services in rural areas.  The PRRM recruited young medical practitioners and sent them to the 
rural areas where the Huk rebels mobilized peasants into anti-government rebellion (Flavier 
1970). After resigning as the health secretary, he ran for the Senate and eventually become the 
Senate President later. Because of the vocal promotion of the reproductive health, however, he 
became a victim of the frontal attack by the CBCP in the early 1990s. 
An international conference served as a trigger to bring President Ramos and the CBCP 
into a collision course (Danguilan 1997). In September 1994, the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) took an initiative to introduce the idea of reproductive health at the 
International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo, Egypt (Ocampo 2014, 
121, 125). With this concept, the UNFPA introduced a human rights-based approach to deal 
with the population problem (Oizumi 2007, 23-24). This new concept allowed two different 
groups to work together. While the old concept of population and family planning could be 
assumed hostile to women’s rights due to its neglect of reproductive rights of women, 
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reproductive health was assumed as a human rights-based approach and worked as a new 
concept with which advocates for family planning, gender equality, and human rights could 
work together (Ocampo 2014, 121-123).   
The CBCP was not at all cooperative to the conference from the beginning.  It 
published, for instance, its pastoral letter on the conference with its concerns about “deep and 
well-founded forebodings” (Morelos 1994). In the letter, CBCP explained that it had already 
communicated with President Ramos and revealed that “[t]he President already knows well the 
Catholic position against direct contraception, direct sterilization and direct abortion” (Morelos 
1994). The CBCP actually succeeded in replacing the delegation head from health secretary 
Juan Flavier to National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) Director General Cieltito 
Habito (UCA News 1994). Flavier had been attacked by Catholic leaders for “his hard-sell 
approach in promoting the government’s family planning program, which promotes liberal use 
of artificial contraceptives” (UCA News 1994).   
Flavier ended up being a member of the delegation, and he was not the only medical 
doctor facing pressure from the Church. Drs. Macagba Tadiar and Marilen Danguilan, members 
of the delegation of the Philippines during the 3rd Preparatory Committee to the ICPD in New 
York in May 1994, were replaced by other delegates who were approved by the Church. The 
two doctors had worked hard for reproductive health for so long. After graduating from medical 
school, for instance, Danguilan faced the reality where patients often return to the clinic not 
simply because of disease but rather because of socio-economic conditions inducing various 
diseases. She was then determined to work in the Senate to make policies to promote public 
health. She closely worked with Senator Edgardo Angara and supported passage of laws on the 
generics medicine, health insurance, anti-smoking, and so on (Danguilan 2014; Dalisay 2015).   
It took five more years, however, for policymakers to draft the first bill for reproductive 
health in 2001 (Ocampo 2014, 125-126). Facing stiff opposition from the CBCP as well as 
direct pressure from the Vatican, President Ramos did not step further on the issue of 
reproductive health during his term (Danguilan 1997, 42). Danguilan reported that Benjamin 
De Leon, the assistant secretary of social service for the president, often told her and other 
delegation members that they had to protect the president (Danguilan 1997, 62). In her study 
on the whole process of international relations on reproductive health published in 1997, 
Danguilan stated that “the Church was – and has been – the most important and powerful 
political player in the country” (Danguilan 1997, 46)11. 
The advocates deepened their network and widened their actions at every occasion in 
local, national and international levels. The health advocates had actually provided various 
community services including enhancement of reproductive health without laws since the 
1960s (Flavier 1970, ch.10). They however faced opposition by several local government heads 
in the late 1990s (Claudio 2015a). For instance, Governor Joey Lina of Laguna Province 
suddenly banned artificial contraceptives from the public health center and clinics in the 
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province (Rimban 1996). Lina was a senator from 1987 to 1992 and an active member of the 
Pro-Life movement (Rimban 1996). Following Governor Lina, Mayor Lito Atienza of Manila 
“banned” contraception in the capital city through his Executive Order (EO) no. 3 in 2000, 
which resulted in fatal consequences on the reproductive health in the capital city (Kebriaei 
2007). 
Against this backdrop, the advocates made use of another momentum at the 
International Conference on Population and Development plus 5 (ICPD plus 5) of the UNFPA 
in Beijing to review the implementation of the Cairo conference (Ocampo 2014, 125-126). In 
the conference, the Filipino delegates composed of Congresswoman Bellaflor Angara-Castillo, 
Dr. Junice Demetrio-Melgar, and others worked together. After the conference, they filed the 
first Reproductive Health bill at the 12th Congress in 2001 (Ocampo 2014, 126). 
Angara-Castillo is a longtime politician in the lower house and became a governor of 
Aurora province later. She was the House Majority Floor Leader from 1998 to 2001 and the 
Deputy Minority Floor Leader from 2001 to 2004 (de la Cruz and Domingo 2014, 71).  She 
depended on her position on her close relations with then President Joseph Estrada whose 
defeated vice presidential candidate was her brother, Senator Edgardo Angara. In addition, 
Demetrio-Melgar and other delegates for the ICPD plus 5 organized the Reproductive Health 
Alliance Network (RHAN) when they filed the bill (Ocampo 2014, 128-129). RHAN is 
composed of 30 organizations and the largest coalition in civil society to promote the RH bill. 
Meanwhile, the Philippine NGO Council on Population, Health and Welfare Inc.(PNGOC) 
worked on networking all over the country (Ocampo 2014, 129).   
Aside from these two consortiums of NGOs, there are two organizations linking them 
with politicians and the private businesses respectively. One is the Philippine Legislators’ 
Committee on Population and Development (PLCPD), which was organized in 1989 to 
advocate population and human development such as reproductive health, public health, and 
gender equality (PLCPD website).12Aside from the RH law, it worked for anti-violence against 
women and anti-human trafficking acts (Ocampo 2014, 127-128). The PLCPD played the role 
of combining legislators and advocates in civil society especially at the second reading of the 
RH bill (Ocampo 2014, 128). Meanwhile, the Forum for Family Planning and Development 
Inc., or the Forum, was organized in 2004 with political or business leaders such as former 
President Ramos and Washington Sycip of the SGV, the largest accounting firm in the country, 
as members.13De Leon, who was the chair of the Philippine delegation to the Cairo conference, 
could bring Ramos to the Forum and induce support from the UNFPA (Ocampo 2014, 134). 
The UNFPA also played an important role in financing the advocacy campaign for RH 
in the Philippines (Ocampo 2014, 129). The UNFPA Philippines actually provided $2.3 million 
for a five-year advocacy and coalition building program from 2005 to 2010 (Ocampo 2014, 
129-130). The UNFPA increased its financial support to the advocates from $2.3 million during 
the Arroyo administration to $6.4 million during the Benigno Aquino administration (Ocampo 
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2014, 137). It is also worth mentioning that the financial assistance during the Arroyo 
administration became largest in the year 2009 when the advocates considered an electoral 
campaign in the coming year (Ocampo 2014, 137). 
While NGOs, politicians, and business leaders began to mobilize their support for the 
RH bill, the CBCP also organized a new coalition called the Pro-Life Coalition in 2008 
(Ocampo 2014, 130). With this coalition, the CBCP could maximize its hierarchical structure 
stretching all over the Philippines. The coalition was also supported by the Pro-Life Foundation 
having advocated anti-abortion since the 1970s in cooperation with the U.S.-based Human Life 
International (Ocampo 2014, 132). The coalition included the Bishops-Legislators Caucus of 
the Philippines (BLCP), a counter organization of PLCPD (Ocampo 2014, 132). One of the 
key opponents of the RH bill was a former Senator, Francisco Tatad, and his wife Fenny 
(Ocampo 2014, 140). They are known as members of the Opus Dei sect of the Catholic Church. 
Opus Dei was one of the conservative sects of the Roman Catholic Church and maintains a 
certain influence in policymaking because of its role at the time of democratization (Hedman 
2006a). Tatad was powerful enough to stop consideration of the RH bill because he was the 
chair of the Committee on Rules and Means. 
Meanwhile, in Congress, Congressman Edcel Lagman, one of the closest allies of then 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, filed House Bill No.5043 (Reproductive Health and 
Population Development) in 2008. Lagman seemed to take over the role of the RH advocate in 
Congress from Angara-Castillo who shifted her focus from the RH bill to the issue of violence 
against women and children, which resulted in the Anti-Violence Against Women and their 
Children Law in 2004 (de la Cruz and Domingo 2014). 
Lagman, however, failed to induce Arroyo’s support to the bill. Arroyo could not push 
through the RH bill, because she desperately needed support from the CBCP in the midst of 
the historically low support rate of the public, several coup attempts, and possible mobilization 
of another popular uprising similar to the ones in 1986 and 2001.  The CBCP openly opposed 
the idea of a popular uprising, while the business leaders, who had once worked with the CBCP, 
aggressively asked for Arroyo’s resignation in public (Hedman 2006b, 188). Instead of the RH 
bill, the Arroyo administration stated that natural family planning, which is acceptable to the 
CBCP, was the only reproductive health policy in 2002 and re-stated it in 2004 through the 
Department of Health administrative order no.125 and 134 respectively (Ocampo 2014, 141). 
The administration actually worked together with the CBCP and claimed that the so-called 
natural family planning is the only RH policy (Ocampo 2014, 141). In this context, Arroyo 
repeatedly instructed her allied legislators to tone down the advocacy for the RH bill. 
Meanwhile, the CBCP worked hard to convince legislators to oppose the RH bill during the 
2010 election. The CBCP published a leaflet entitled, “Catechism on Family and Life for the 
2010 elections” with which priests and bishops talked directly to politicians in their districts to 
support candidates opposing the RH bill (Ocampo 2014, 142). Some of the high-ranking priests 
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even used the holy mass to proclaim their oppositions against the RH bill (Ocampo 2014, 142). 
During the 2010 election, Benigno Aquino, then the presidential candidate of the 
Liberal Party, expressed his support to the RH bill at the risk of losing supports from the CBCP 
(Ocampo 2014, 135). After the election, President Aquino included the RH bill in the priority 
bills and mentioned it in his 2012 State of the Nation Address (Ocampo 2014. 135). Meanwhile, 
Congressman Lagman who remained in the minority as the Minority Floor Leader still worked 
for the RH bill. President Aquino took at least twice direct actions to support the bill in 2012. 
On August 6, he held a lunch meeting with about 180 legislators at Malacañang Palace to stop 
further interpellation for the RH bill (Ocampo 2014, 135-136). On December 3, before the third 
or the final reading on the RH bill, President Aquino met Liberal Party legislators and 
convinced opponents within the party either to abstain or to be absent during the voting sessions 
(Ocampo 2014, 136). The bill was finally passed on December 12, 2012. 
 
The policy coalition for education reform 
In the case of education reform, it is difficult to figure out clear opponents, which does not 
reflect easiness of the reform. In fact, the advocacy for a 12-year basic education has a longer 
history of defeat than that for reproductive health. According to the Department of Education 
(DepEd), the Philippines witnessed nine proposals to extend the educational period for almost 
a century (DepEd 2010). All the proposals were, however, either directly opposed or neglected 
for various reasons. The 1930 proposal to restore the last grade at the primary school was, for 
instance, suspended and never implemented until the K-12 (DepEd 2010). 
Most of those who opposed the extension were indeed supportive of improving the 
educational environment of their children. They differ however from the reform advocates in 
their priority. The opponents of the education year extension prioritize the way to fix existing 
problems such as the lack of school facilities, teachers, teaching materials, and so on. Besides, 
those who had difficulty in sending their children due to various reasons including costs for 
transportation or tuition fees in the case of private schools have opposed the extension of the 
education period. In a weak state, as other scholars have emphasized, politicians seek for 
tangible and short-time benefits for their own districts, while they neglect the national agenda. 
As we will see below, some politicians indeed call the reform anti-mass reform. The reform is 
another academic puzzle to be examined. 
In search of reformers, we should study the failed attempt of the bridge program under 
the Arroyo administration. Then Education Secretary Edilberto de Jesus in cooperation with 
his undersecretary Juan Miguel Luz worked for this program to support students who would 
like to go to university but need to study further (DepEd 2003). Secretary de Jesus issued 
DepEd Order No. 8 s. 2003, or the academic focused-bridging program integrated into the non-
formal education accreditation and equivalency system, in order to address the learning needs 
of those who plan to enter college (DepEd 2003). They recognized that almost half of public 
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school students failed to meet the cut-off score of 30 % at their high school readiness test (Lee-
Bargo 2004).14The department also paid attention to the result of the international tests such as 
2003 TIMSS, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, seriously, because the 
Philippines ranked 34 out 38 countries (DepEd 2010, 3). They found that they needed to add 
one more year to help students to understand especially English, mathematics and science. In 
an interview, Luz told this writer that they tried to “smuggled in” an additional year through 
the bridge program (Luz 2015). 
President Arroyo, however, opposed the DepEd Order No. 8 and compelled them to 
abandon the bridge program. Within a year, the Department of Education decided to make the 
bridge program optional. Secretary de Jesus did not hide his disappointment on this decision 
and said that they should find a way to improve the score of their children (Lee-Bargo 2004). 
Soon after, de Jesus resigned and the post was taken over by Florencio “Butch” Abad who also 
resigned in 2005 because of the exposure of possible electoral fraud of President Arroyo in 
2004. Luz finally resigned from the post in 2006 after continuing political turmoil created by 
the scandal and an excessive pressure from the Palace to fund a program of Arroyo’s close ally 
in Congress (Araneta 2005; Lorenzo 2008).15Luz then played an important role to organize a 
broader network for reform as we will see below. 
Some business leaders organized an association to advocate education policy reform, 
especially the extension of the education cycle to 12 years. Ramon del Rosario Jr. organized 
the Philippine Business for Education (PBED) in 2006 (Torres 2006). The PBED’s board of 
trustees is composed of business leaders such as Jose Cuisia, Jr. who is the former Central Bank 
governor and the president of the Philippine American Life and General Insurance, Oscar 
Lopez, Manuel Pangilinan, Washington Sycip and Jaime A. Zobel de Ayala II, in addition to 
Del Rosario.16These names are familiar with the people who know the “business activism” in 
the people power revolution in 1986 (Hedman 2006a). Ramon V. del Rosario, father of Ramon 
del Rosario of the PBED, for instance, worked hard to support the electoral watch movement, 
National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), in the 1950s (Hedman 2006a, 
54-55). Washington Sycip, a founder of the country’s top accounting firm, SGV, has been active 
in the social engagements of the private business and worked for organizing the Philippine 
Business for Social Progress in the 1960s (Hedman 2006a, 100-102). Ramon himself was one 
of the prime movers of the Makati Business Club, an organization of Manila-based business 
leaders to oppose crony capitalism under the Marcos regime (Hedman 2006a: 104, also c.f. 
Mikamo 2013). Luz’s brother, Guillermo Luz, was the executive secretary of the Makati 
Business Club and actively asked for the resignation of President Arroyo in 2005 (Araneta 
2005). 
Politicians opposing the Arroyo administration gradually realized the issue and indeed 
prepared the bill. Then Senator and opposition Liberal Party (LP) President Mar Roxas 
submitted Senate Bill No. 2294 (Omnibus Education Reform Act of 2008).17In his explanatory 
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note to the bill, Roxas advocated that the government should extend its basic education to 12 
years and also provide universal and compulsory one year pre-school (Roxas 2008). Roxas’ 
bill was, however, pending in the Committee on Education, Arts and Culture after the first 
reading. 
Meanwhile, President Arroyo had organized the Presidential Task Force for Education 
chaired by Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, the president of the Ateneo de Manila University, in 
September 2007. The Task Force was assigned to review the existing education system and to 
make various recommendation to the president (Nebres 2010). In its terminal report published 
in May 2010, Chairman Nebres pointed out high dropout rates and low performance in basic 
education as well as mismatching in the job market for college graduates (Nebres 2010, 3). He 
actually mentioned that the 10-year basic education can be a part of the problems but did not 
elaborate on any policy proposal on this issue (Nebres 2010, 19). Instead, the Task Force 
recommended further institutional reform to strengthen cooperation mechanism among three 
education agencies, to enhance functions of the local education boards at the local government 
level, and to encourage the education sector to work more closely with the business sector to 
increase job opportunity (Nebres 2010).18The proposal must sound well for the politicians who 
are seeking for funds to build schools or to increase teaching materials in their own districts. 
The reform advocates had to wait for the election in 2010and the establishment of a new 
administration. 
In the midst of the electoral campaign, Benigno Aquino announced his educational 
reform agenda at the meeting of the 3rd National Congress of the Coordinating Council for 
Private Educational Associations of the Philippines on February 11, 2010. Aquino, who had 
supported the above-mentioned Roxas’ bill as an LP member, claimed that he would extend 
basic education once he won the election. It is interesting to remember that both Aquino and 
Roxas were not well-known as politicians who are keen to promote education reforms. For 
instance, Roxas established his career as an investment banker as well as secretary of trade and 
industry, while Aquino’s political asset was more or less limited to the fact that he was the son 
of the icons of Philippine democracy, Benigno and Corazon Aquino. It is therefore important 
to know what the policy coalitions led by the PBED did. 
A few months after the election, Luz revealed the members of the education reform 
team of the LP in public (Luz 2010, 12). The team was composed of former education 
secretaries Ed de Jesus, Butch Abad, Fe Hidalgo and Erlina Pefianco as well as former 
education undersecretaries, Chito Gascon and Luz himself. The board members of the PBED 
loudly supported Aquino’s agenda for educational policy reform. Sycip said, “Definitely, I am 
in favor of pushing for a 12-year basic education because our college graduates are below par 
with the rest of the world” in his interview with a business daily (Reyes 2010, 5). Echoing 
Sycip’s view, del Rosario argued that Philippine education should be “at par with global 
standards” (Reyes 2010, 5). He argued that the K-12 was a key agenda to improve the quality 
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of education.   
Meanwhile, in Congress, Senator Edgardo Angara, then the chair of the committee on 
education, supported the 12-year education cycle. He argues that, “[i]n education, the most 
fundamental proposal is the additional two years in our basic education curriculum” (Angara 
2010, 11). Angara was once called “Senate’s Mr. Education”, because of his interest in 
education (Joaquin 2006). He was a lawyer by profession but was appointed the president of 
the University of the Philippines in 1981 before running for the Senate in 1987. He established 
his political career especially in the field of education and health and rose to the Office of the 
Senate President from 1993 to 1995 (Joaquin 2006; also, cf. Danguilan 2014). 
There seems to be no strong counter-argument from the opposition. Majority Floor 
Leader, Senator Vicente Sotto, for instance, accused big business of advocating “anti-poor” 
reform (Purificacion 2010, 14). He argued that the reform would be an additional burden on 
poor families who had difficulty in sending their children because of various costs of education 
(Purificacion 2010, 14). Another Senator, Antonio Trillanes, questioned the impact of the K-
12 on the quality of education and asserted that the government address the issues of the lack 
of teachers and classrooms first (Salita 2010, 6). These arguments remind us of the 
recommendation of Arroyo’s task force headed by Nebres. Nebres, in fact, opposed the reform 
plan saying that the governments hould fix the existing problems such as lack of educational 
facilities first. Otherwise, the additional two more years might end up with an additional 
number of students who cannot complete their study (Tiangco 2010, 5). 
In the midst of the heated debate, the above-mentioned PBED and the Department of 
Education signed a memorandum of agreement not only to reiterate the PBED’s commitment 
to support the K-12 but to express their commitment to hiring the graduates of K-12 (Ronda 
2010, 13). There can be found more direct linkage between the policy advocates and interests 
of business practitioners in the business process outsourcing industry. The business process 
outsourcing industry is the beneficiary of the reform. Alfredo Ayala, the president of the 
Business Processing Association of the Philippines (BPAP), admitted that the industry will get 
benefits from the reform (Hernando-Malipot 2010, 3). The BPAP is in fact one of the 
organizations to sign the MoA with the Department of Education. As Raquiza has revealed, 
several business elites have heavily invested in education as well as business process 
outsourcing business (Raquiza 2014; 2015). A support from the BPAP reflected the changing 
dynamics of the Philippine political economy, which is now led by the service sector 
spearheaded by business process outsourcing (Raquiza 2015).   
On May 15, 2013, President Aquino signed the bill into law and the government finally 
carried out the longtime agenda for education reform. It is important to recognize the fact that 
the Aquino administration carried out the reform which had been discussed more than a half 
century, although the opposition failed to develop a convincing counterargument. Without the 
support from the private business, the administration would not have worked for the reform. It 
 15 
seems too much, however, if we claim that the business leaders were the sole reform agents in 
the story of educational reform. The following fourth section addresses the remaining question 
why these reforms were possible under the Benigno Aquino administration. 
 
Revisiting the Benigno Aquino administration 
One of the remaining questions is the timing of the reform. Why was the Aquino administration 
able to carry out the reform, while the Arroyo administration failed to complete or neglect the 
issue at the beginning? One simple answer to this is the high support rate President Aquino 
enjoyed. The following tables clearly show the popularity of President Aquino compared with 
that of President Arroyo. President Noynoy Aquino was popular mainly because of his family 
background. Noynoy is the only son of the late senator and the icon of Philippine democracy, 
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Noynoy was suddenly on the spot after the death of former 
President Corazon Aquino, who herself is another icon of Philippine democracy. 
Considering the fact that Arroyo desperately sought for support from the Church and 
could not take any bold actions to carry out the reproductive health issue, it sounds convincing 
that the high support rate at least helps President Aquino to take a political risk. 
This assertion does not sound convincing, however, once we look back at the support 
rates of other presidents in Figure 1. Both Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos enjoyed a certain 
amount of the support bud did not push through the reform, though they knew the issues. What 
is the difference between President Benigno Aquino and his predecessors? We now turn to the 
supporting rate of not the president but the administration in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Net satisfaction ratings of the Presidents 
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Source: Social WeatherStations, http://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20161215093954 
accessed on January 8, 2017. 
 
Figure2.Net satisfaction with general performance of the national administration 
 
Source: Social Weather Stations,http://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20161117111243accessed 
on January 8, 2017 
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Figure2 clearly reveals a remarkable supporting rate for the Noynoy Aquino 
administration compared with other administrations. The Filipino people distinguish their 
opinion on the president from that of the administration. We should look at what the 
administration has done. 
Figure 2 reveals the record-low support rate of the Arroyo administration. It is quite 
puzzling, if we only consider economic performance as an indicator to explain the satisfaction 
with the administration’s performance, as Thompson puts it (Thompson 2014).  The Arroyo 
administration left a relatively healthy macroeconomic performance but ended up with such a 
low support rate. We should understand a political logic with which the Aquino administration 
picked up social policy rather than economic policy as landmark legislations. There are voices 
that demand social welfare aside from the healthy macroeconomic management. We now turn 
to the analysis of the policy coalitions in a longer time frame going beyond a single 
administration. 
First of all, there is a gradual change in civil society. The Philippines witnessed a 
resurgence of the social democrats from the 1990s. As this writer has briefly mentioned in 
earlier sections, there is a group of policymakers who split from the Communist Party and 
began to work closely with the social democrats (Quimpo 2008). According to their memoir 
(Tolosa 2011), they organized themselves from the 1960s in response to the deteriorating 
credibility of the established political parties and increasing number of radical student 
movements because of the influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 19 After 
democratization, the Communist Party lost its popular support mainly because of its decision 
not to join the election in 1984, while the people who had worked as social democrats gained 
their momentum in the restored democratic government of President Corazon Aquino. 
Although they failed to consolidate their influence within the administration, they learned how 
to manage the administration (Tolosa 2011). There are several key players within the Noynoy 
Aquino administration who came from this tradition.  Among others, Butch Abad, former 
education secretary, has played a key role in the Noynoy administration as the budget secretary. 
In the House of Representatives, party-list Representative Risa Hontiveros, who had risen from 
the tradition of the social democratic movement, maximized her close relations with President 
Aquino in the policy making process of the reproductive health law (Claudio 2015a). 
In addition to a change in the traditional left, the civil society movements accumulated 
their experience in law making. NGOs such as Likhaan worked for reproductive health at the 
local level without a national RH law but faced opposition from local politicians including the 
mayor of the capital city. Sylvia Claudio, one of the co-founders of Likhaan, told this writer 
that they therefore decided to push for a law to establish a legal ground for their activities 
(Claudio 2015a). Another development in the civil society movement should not be 
underestimated, because the activists have gradually learned to participate in elections and 
public administration. The active members of a small but coherent party, Akbayan, played 
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certain roles in the Noynoy administration. Quimpo’s work on the transformation of the left 
movement can be read as a study on the learning process by the social movement activists who 
once took a militant and confrontational strategy and then gradually changed its strategy to win 
elections and even to manage public administration. However, the Akbayan party faced a 
challenge of leadership, when Walden Bello, a leading figure of the party and representative in 
Congress, resigned from Congress as a result of differences with the Aquino administration. 
Facing Bello’s criticism, Claudio as a member of the party’s Executive Committee introduced 
the argument of Richard Rorty saying: 
 
the biggest gains were achieved not by people who measured their actions against some 
future vision of socialist utopias but by pragmatic considerations of what was merely 
better than what existed (Claudio 2015b). 
 
Throughout their experience working as a coalition partner of the president, this section 
of the left movement transformed their politics. 
In addition, there are politicians who are well aware of social policy. Throughout the 
study on social policy reform, this writer has often bumped into the name of the Angaras. Dr. 
Danguilan worked at Angara’s office in drafting various laws for public health (Danguilan 
2014). Senator Angara is the brother of Bella Angara-Castillo and also worked closely with 
Edcel Lagman, both of whom worked hard for the RH law. Although Angara failed to win the 
vice-presidential election in 1998, he continued to serve as a powerful senator until his 
retirement in 2013 (Dalisay 2015). In a political system where the Senate has often been 
assumed a training ground for future presidents, Angara’s success in the Senate is worth 
mentioning. Although Angara was neither a member of the Liberal Party nor Akbayan, he 
supported the administration’s education agenda as a leading member of the majority coalition 
in the Senate. In one sense, the career of the Angaras represents the career of politicians who 
emerged from the strand of the middle force of people power in 1986.  
Lagman, whose brother was killed by militant communists because of his leadership of 
a split faction, was a lawyer but worked both at the government and a private law firm before 
he himself joined the anti-Marcos struggle as a human rights lawyer (Teehankee 2012, 63). 
After democratization, he won the election and worked for agrarian reform, government’s debt 
management, and education while maintaining close relations with Senator Angara (Teehankee 
2012, 64-65). He was ambitious enough to run for the Senate though he failed. While he was 
one of the most loyal supporters of President Arroyo, he worked hard to pass the RH bill at the 
sacrifice of the chairmanship of the Committee on Appropriation in Congress. 
These politicians were not so straightforward in their ideological position. In fact, 
Senator Edgardo Angara was taken over by his son. Angara-Castillo became governor of 
Aurora province after her term was over and won another term in the Lower House in 2013, 
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while Lagman’s seat was taken over by his son, Edcel Lagman, Jr. One can criticize these 
politicians that they have become a part of political dynasties after 1986, dominating the seats 
with their own family members (cf. Teehankee 2012).We don’t need to underestimate, however, 
the fact that they can work with reform advocates as we have seen in this study. 
 
Conclusion 
The politics of social policymaking reveals the dynamic aspect of the politics of policy 
coalitions. First, the policy coalitions reflect transformations of civil society. In addition to the 
NGO workers in the field, there are NGOs working for policymaking such as the PLCPD or 
PBED. These NGOs are supported by professionals, including medical practitioners or 
business leaders. Some medical practitioners had offered necessary social services in the field 
of RH but faced with opposition from local governments, which triggered their policy advocacy 
at the national level involving several politicians. Moreover, they broadened the coalition by 
reframing the issue not only as women’s rights but as reproductive health, which allowed 
women’s activists, economists, and medical practitioners to work together. In the case of K-12, 
the coalition is heavily supported by private business leaders who do not necessarily share the 
purpose of the reform with education specialists. The contested political process is not always 
dominated by the oligarchs and the left. 
Second, some politicians cooperated with the reform advocates and worked together 
with the former. In both cases of the RH law and K-12, we can hardly neglect the roles played 
by the Angaras and those who closely worked with them such as Edcel Lagman. They could 
be assumed as being a part of a political dynasty using the network of their family but could 
work for a reform agenda. They are different from those who only follow the logic of the 
presidential bandwagon. It is interesting to remember that Congressman Lagman was often 
categorized as one of then President Arroyo’s loyal allies in Congress when he advocated the 
RH bill which Arroyo had never supported. Politicians do not necessarily follow the orientation 
of the president despite the latter’s power to control patronage.  
Third, the presidents might oppose or support the policy agenda but does not dominate 
the entire process of policymaking. President Benigno Aquino indeed played an important role 
in policy making in the final phase but he was not the one to take the initiative at the beginning 
of the actual law making. The reform advocates had worked before the inauguration of the 
Aquino administration. The politics of the policy coalitions is therefore not dominated by the 
president but is open to the policy advocates who can make broad coalitions in civil society, 
Congress and the presidential palace. 
In addition, a porous nature of the policymaking encourages various actors to play the 
role in policymaking. Some of them are professionals who have once worked at the government 
as presidential appointees but also worked in private sectors based on their own profession. 
They do not stop working for the public interest even after their departure from the 
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administration. In the field of public health, medical doctors worked for reform in cooperation 
with various NGOs and business leaders, while in the education sector, the business leaders 
concerning about the quality of graduate have worked for reform. The brief sketch of the 
politics of policy reform reveals the existence of policy coalition which is not limited to the 
government and worked for policy reform. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This is one of the products of the Emerging State Project under the Grant-in-Aid research 
projects No. 25101004 and the Leading Initiative for Excellent Young Researchers of the 
Japanese government. The writer gratefully acknowledges comments and suggestions on 
earlier drafts by Lisandro Claudio, Veerayooth Kanchoochat, Fumiharu Mieno, Yoichiro Mine, 
Masayuki Tanimoto, and Keiichi Tsunekawa as well as key interviewees such as Marilen 
Danguilan, Juan Miguel Luz, and Sylvia Claudio Estrada. Among them, the writer is very much 
grateful for Dr. Danguilan who has provided vital help since the very early stage of this research. 
The writer is also grateful for detailed comments from two anonymous reviewers; they, of 
course, bear no responsibility for any error in this research. 
 
About the contributor 
Yusuke Takagi, Doctor of the Science of Law (SJD), is Assistant Professor, National Graduate 
Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan. His doctoral dissertation is recently 
published as, Central Banking as State Building: Policymakers and Their Nationalism in the 
Philippines, 1933-1964. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press and Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2016). 
 
References 
Abinales, Patricio. N. 2005. Governing the Philippines in the Early 21st Century. In After the 
Crisis: Hegemony, Technocracy and Governance in Southeast Asia, edited byShiraishi 
Takashi and Patricio N. Abinales, 134-155. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. 
Anderson, Benedict. R. O’G. 1988. “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and 
Dreams.”New Left Review 169: 3-31.  
Angara, Edgardo J. 2010. “More Critical than Ever.” Manila Bulletin, August 15: 11. 
Araneta, S. 2005. “Sacked DepEd Exec Won’t Leave Government.”Philippine Star, September 
2 http://www.philstar.com/headlines/298768/sacked-deped-exec-won%C2%92t-leave-
government 
Bautista, Julius. 2010. “Church and State in the Philippines: Tracking Life Issues in a ‘Culture 
of Death’” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia. 25 (1): 29-53. 
Claudio, Lisandro E. 2013. Taming People’s Power: The EDSA Revolutions and their 
Contradictions. Quezon City: ADMU Press.  
 21 
Claudio, Sylvia Estrada. 2015a. Personal Interview, Quezon City, Metro Manila. Sept. 23. 
Claudio, Sylvia Estrada. 2015b. “The conscience of another progressive: Why I stay on with 
Akbayan” Rappler, Nov. 9. http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/112151-conscience-
progressive-staying-akbayan 
Dalisay, Jose Y. 2015. Edgardo J. Angara: In the grand manner. Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines Press. 
Danguilan, Marilen J. 1997. Women in brackets: A chronicle of Vatican power and control. 
Pasig City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. 
Danguilan, Marilen.2014. Personal interview, Makati City, Metro Manila. August 16. 
De Jesus, Edilberto.2010. “Education Reform.” Business World, September3: 4-5. 
de la Cruz, Abigail. R. and Michelle. H. Domingo. 2014. “The Passage of the Law to Address 
Violence against Women in the Philippines.” In Room for Maneuver: Social Sector Reform 
in the Philippines, edited byR. Fabella, J. Faustino, A. Leftwich, and A. Parker, 57-91. 
Makati City: The Asian Foundation. 
DepEd [Department of Education]. 2003. “Academic focused-bridging program integrated in 
the no formal education accreditation and equivalency system” DepEd Order No. 8, s. 2003, 
Feb. 12. 
———. 2010. “Discussion Paper on The Enhanced K+12 Basic Education Program,” DepEd 
Discussion Paper, 05 October. 
Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Faustino, Jaime. and Raul. Fabella. 2014. “The Philippine Cont ext for Social Reform.” In 
Room for Maneuver: Social Sector Reform in the Philippines. Eds. Fabella, Raul, Jaime. 
Faustino, Adrian. Leftwich, and Andrew. Parker, 29-55. Makati City: The Asian Foundation. 
Flavier, Juan M. 1970. Doctor to the Barrios, Experiences with the Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movement. Manila: New Day Publishers. 
Haggard, Stephan and Robert. R. Kaufman. 2008. Development, Democracy, and Welfare 
States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. 2006a. In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to 
People Power in the Philippines. Quezon City: ADMU Press. 
Hedma, Eva-Lotta E. 2006b. “The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New Conjuncture.” 
Asian Survey, 46 (1): 187-193. 
Hernando-Malipot, I. 2010. “DepEd’s K + 12 PlanSeen to Boost BPO.” Manila Bulletin, Nov. 
4:3. 
InterAksyon. 2014. Juan Flavier - Mr. Let’s DOH It, People’s Senator – quietly passes away. 
(http://www.interaksyon.com/article/98237/juan-flavier---mr--lets-doh-it-peoples-senator--
-quietly-passes-away, accessed Oct. 30, 2014)) 
Kasuya, Yuko2008. Presidential Bandwagon: Parties and Party Systems in the Philippines. 
 22 
Tokyo: Keio University Press. 
Katzenstein, Peter. J. 2005. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kebriaei, Pardiss. (ed.) 2007. Imposing Misery: The Impact of Manila’s Ban on Contraception. 
Quezon City: Kikhaan, Manila: ReproCen, and New York: Center for Reproductive Rights. 
Kuhonta, ErikM. 2008. “Studying States in Southeast Asia.” In Southeast Asia in Political 
Science, Eds. E. M. Kuhonta, D. Slater, and T. Vu, 30-54. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Legaspi, Leonardo Z. 1990. “Guiding Principles of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the 
Philippines on population control.” 
http://cbcpwebsite.com/1990s/1990/guidingprinciple.html 
Lee-Brago,P. 2004. DepEd bridge program now optional. Philippine Star. June 9, 2004 
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/253149/deped-bridge-program-now-optional. 
Lorenzo, I. 2008. “Politics causes civil service to lose a few good men and women.” Philippine 
Star, April 27. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/58508/politics-causes-civil-service-
lose-%E2%80%98-few-good-men-and-women%E2%80%99. 
Luz, Juan Miguel. 2015. Personal Interview, Makati City, Metro Manila. Sept. 26. 
McCoy, Alfred(ed.)1994. An Anarchy of Families: State and Society in the Philippines. Quezon 
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 
Mikamo, Shingo. 2013. “Business Associations and Politics in the post-EDSA Philippines: 
Neither Oligarchy nor Civil Society.”Philippine Political Science Journal34 (1): 6-26. 
Morelos, Carmelo. D. F. 1994. “Pastoral Statement on the Cairo International Conference on 
Population and Development.” Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines. 
http://cbcpwebsite.com/1990s/1994/cairo.html 
Nebres, Bienvenido F. 2010. The Philippine Main Education Highway: Terminal Report of the 
Presidential Task Force for Education to the President and the Cabinet. Manila: Malacanang 
Palace. 
Ocampo, Jamir. N. P. 2014. “Structure and Agency in Contentious Reform: Reproductive 
Health Policy in the Philippines.” In Room for Maneuver: Social Sector Reform in the 
Philippines, edited by RaulFabella, Jaime Faustino, Adrian Leftwich, and Andrew Parker, 
119-150. Makati City: The Asian Foundation. 
Odchimar, Nereo. P. 2011. “Choosing Life, Rejecting the RH bill.” Pastoral Letter of the 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines. 
http://cbcpwebsite.com/2010s/2011/choosing.html  
Oizumi, Keiichiro. (大泉啓一郎). 2007. Oiteyuku Ajia: Han’ei no Kozu ga Kawaru Toki (老い
てゆくアジア―繁栄の構図が変わるとき, Aging Asia: When the Prosperous Picture Changes). 
Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, Inc. 
Philippine Statistical Authority. 2010. Census of Population and Housing. 
 23 
https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/census/population-and-housing. 
Pepinsky, Thomas. B. 2015. “Political Business and External Vulnerability in Southeast Asia.” 
In Two Crises: Different Outcomes; East Asia and Global Finance. Eds. T. J. Pempel and 
Keiichi Tsunekawa,137-162. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Purificacion, M. 2010. “Sotto Slam Business over K + 12 Education Program.” People’s 
Tonight. October 8: 14. 
Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. 2008. Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after 
Marcos. Monograph 58/ Yale Southeast Asia Studies. New Heaven: Yale University Press. 
Rimban, L. 1996.“Laguna bans condoms, other contraceptives in public clinics” Manila 
Standard, June. 9, p. 6. Google News 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1370&dat=19960609&id=eqEVAAAAIBAJ&sji
d=WgsEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6478,1289235&hl=ja 
Ramos, Fidel V. 1993. “Second State of the Nation Address.” Delivered at the Batasang 
Pambansa, Quezon City, July 26, 1993. (http://www.gov.ph/1993/07/26/fidel-v-ramos-
second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1993/, accessed on April 25, 2015). 
Raquiza, Antoinette R. 2012. State Structure, Policy Formation, and Economic Development 
in Southeast Asia. New York: Routledge. 
———.2014. “Changing configuration of Philippine capitalism” Philippine Political Science 
Journal. 35(2): 225-250. 
———.2015. “Philippine service sector, politics and governance issue” Working paper for the 
Emerging States Project Workshop “Beyond crises and traps in Southeast Asia: Reshaping 
economic strategies, social policies and political configurations” National Graduate Institute 
for Policy Studies (GRIPS), May 15 –16, 2015 
Reyes, R. R. 2010. “Top Execs Still Pushing for 12-year Education.” Business Mirror, August 
15: 5. 
Rocamora, Joel.1994. Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist Party of the 
Philippines. Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Co. 
Ronda, R. A. 2010. “PBED throws Support behind K + 12 Plan.” Philippine Star, Oct. 21: 13. 
Salita, R. T. 2010. “Trillanes Finds K + 12 Questionable.”Manila Standard Today June 10: 6. 
Sidel, John. 2014. “Achieving Reforms in Oligarchical Democracies: The Role of Leaderships 
and Coalitions in the Philippines.” Research Paper 27 Developmental Leadership Program, 
University of Birmingham.  
Tadem, Teresa. S. Encarnacion., Khoo Boo Teik, and Shiraishi Takashi. eds. 2014. “Special 
Issue: The Politics of Technocracy in Southeast Asia.” Southeast Asian Studies 3(2): 241-
438. 
Takagi, Yusuke. 2016. Central Banking as State Building: Policymakers and Their Nationalism 
in the Philippines, 1933-1964. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, Singapore: 
National University of Singapore Press and Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. 
 24 
Teehankee, Julio C. 2012. “Emerging Dynasties in the Post-Marcos House of Representatives.” 
Philippine Political Science Journal. 22 (45): 55-78. 
Thompson, Mark R. 1996. The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic 
Transition in the Philippines. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. 
Thompson, Mark R. 2010. “After populism: Winning the ‘war’ for bourgeois democracy in the 
Philippines” In The politics of change in the Philippines, edited by Yuko Kasuya and Nathan 
G. Quimpo, 21-46, Pasig City: Anvil. 
Thompson, Mark R. 2014. “The politics Philippine presidents make.” Critical Asian Studies. 
46(3), 433-460. 
Tiangco, J. C. 2010. “LES LunchesDrive vs K + 12.” People’s Tonight. October 7: 5. 
Torres, T. P. 2006. “Top Business Execs Lend Hand in Flaws in RP Education.” Philippine Star, 
August 25  http://www.philstar.com/business/354557/top-business-execs-lend-hand-
flaws-rp-education 
Tolosa, Benjamin T. ed. 2011. Socdem: Filipino Social Democracy in a Time of Turmoil and 
Transition, 1965-1995. Manila: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
UCA News. 1994. “Changes in Cairo Delegation Reflect Church-led Pressure” 
http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/1994/09/02/changes-in-cairo-
delegation-reflect-churchled-pressure&post_id=45892 
Youngblood, Robert L. 1987. “The Corazon Aquino ‘Miracle’ and the Philippine Churches.” 
Asian Survey 27 (12): 1240-1255.  
Youngbood, Robert L. 1998. “President Ramos, the Church, and Population Policy in the 
Philippines.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 25 (1): 3-19. 
Notes 
1 This paper focuses only on reform through policymaking while some may be interested in 
other forms of reform in general under the Benigno Aquino administration. It also categorizes 
the policy under the umbrella of social policy following a custom of study on social welfare 
regimes (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 2008). The actual framing of the policy by the 
policymakers is more diverse as discussed in sections two and three. 
2 Sidel argues that reform coalitions played a pivotal role in the Sin Tax Reform and the 
electoral reform in the ARMM (Sidel 2014). The writer appreciates Professor Teresa 
Encarnacion Tadem of the University of the Philippines for informing him of the work by Sidel. 
3 “K-12” stands for Kindergarten to Grade 12-year basic education. 
4 Landmark Legislation, Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. 
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(http://www.gov.ph/aquino-administration/landmark-legislation/ accessed on April 22, 2015) 
5After the passage of the RH law, the Supreme Court struck down eight provisions.  The writer 
focuses on the process making the law, because he is interested in the emergence of the policy 
coalitions, which itself is an intellectual puzzle considering existing literature on Philippine 
politics. 
6 They covered the time period before the inauguration of the Benigno Aquino administration. 
7 This paper focuses on the role of ambitious politicians whose actions are essential in the long 
process of policymaking regardless of their motivation because of two reasons. First, this paper 
aims at revealing the entire process of policymaking in which ambitious politicians are one of 
the essential players. Second, the writer believes that it is worth featuring the positive roles of 
the politicians, which are often forgotten in the literature highlighting oligarchy. It might be a 
coming agenda to identify the objectives of these politicians in a future study where the 
researcher should shift its focus from the policymaking to broader political actions by the 
politicians.  
8 The metaphor of porous state comes from the idea of a porous region by Katzenstein (2005). 
9  Bautista aptly mentions that there are varieties of position within the Catholic Church 
(Bautista 2010). 
10 According to a survey by the Philippine government, the population growth rates in the 
1990s and 2000s were 2.34% and 1.90% respectively (Philippine Statistical Authority 2010). 
11 She told this writer that that the Catholic Church was the most powerful political player in 
the country in the context of the ICPD POA in 1997 but that she is not sure today. (personal 
correspondence, June 11, 2016) 
12 http://www.plcpd.com/ accessed on Feb. 2, 2015. 
13 http://www.forum4fp.org/ accessed on Nov. 10, 2015. 
14The following indicator reveals problems in students’ performance in mathematics, science 
and Englisn from 2004 to 2010. 
1 The Sin Tax Reform Act
2 The Enhanced Basic Education Act
3 The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
4 The Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act
5 The Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act
6 The Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012
7 The Domestic Workers Act
8 The AFP Modernization Act
9 The National Health Insurance Act
10 The National Electrification Administration Reform Act
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15 In 2005, the possible electoral fraud during the 2004 election came under the spot light, 
which resulted in resignation of high rank officials including education secretary Butch Abad. 
Some of the cabinet members who resigned at that time were appointed department secretaries 
under the Benigno  Aquino administration in 2010.   
16  Philippine Business of Education, Board of Trustees (http://www.pbed.ph/organization, 
accessed on April 22, 2015). 
17 The Liberal Party worked for the presidency of Roxas until the time when Roxas withdrew 
his candidacy and decided to run for the vice presidency with Aquino in 2009.  After losing 
the 2010 election, he was appointed the Secretary of Transportation and Communications 
(2011-2012) and the Secretary of Interior and Local Government (2012-2015).   
18 The Philippine government has three education agencies: the Department of Education for 
basic education, the Commission on Higher Education for higher education, and the Technical 
Education and Skills Development Authority for vocational education. 
19 The Communist Party of the Philippines as well as its militant organ, the New People’s 
Army, were established in 1968 and 1969 respectively (Rocamora 1994). 
Performance indicator, achievement rate at secondary school (public school), unit %
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mathematics 50.70% 47.82% 39.05% 42.85% 38.03% 39.64% 42.00%
Science 39.49% 37.98% 41.99% 46.71% 42.11% 43.80% 39.35%
English 51.33% 47.73% 51.78% 53.46% 52.90% 46.95% 46.45%
Source: Department of Education factsheet Nov 16, 2011,
(https://web.archive.org/web/20120505102607/http://www.deped.gov.ph/factsandfigures/default.a
sp accessed on Nov. 8, 2015).
